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Summary
Traditionally, most health care systems which pretend to any sort of rationality and cost control have sought to
allocate their limited funds in order to secure equal opportunity of access for equal need. The UK government is
implementing a fundamental change of resource allocation philosophy towards ‘contributing to the reduction of
avoidable health inequalities’. The purpose of this essay is to explore some of the economic issues that arise when
seeking to allocate health care resources according to the new criterion. It indicates that health inequalities might
arise because of variations in the quality of health services, variations in access to those services, or variations in the
way people produce health, and that the resource allocation consequences differ depending on which source is being
addressed. The paper shows that an objective of reducing health inequalities is not necessarily compatible with an
objective of equity of access, nor with the objective of maximising health gain. The results have profound
consequences for approaches towards economic evaluation, the role of clinical guidelines and performance
management, as well as for resource allocation methods. Copyright
Capitation and health policy
In many developed nations, the system of health
care finance is increasingly being used as an
important instrument in seeking to secure a fair
distribution of health care resources. To this end,
many nations have increasingly turned to the use
of ‘capitations’ as a basis for guiding the distribu-
tion of health care expenditure [1]. A capitation
payment can be defined as the amount of health
service funds associated with a citizen for a
particular time period. Effectively, a capitation
system puts a ‘price’ on the head of every member.
Clearly, the expected health care expenditure needs
of citizens vary considerably, depending on
personal characteristics such as age, morbidity
and social circumstances. Considerable effort has
therefore, been expended on the process known as
risk adjustment, which seeks an unbiased estimate
of the expected costs of a citizen relative to all
other citizens.
One of the earliest developments in the use of
capitation methods in the finance of health care was
the work in England of the Resource Allocation
Working Party in the 1970s [2]. This sought to
allocate a fixed National Health Service (NHS)
budget to geographical regions in accordance with
an equity criterion of seeking to secure ‘equal
opportunity of access for those at equal risk’. The
methods adopted by the Resource Allocation
Working Party have been superceded by more
empirically based approaches [3,4]. However, the
underlying equity objective has not changed.
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As with most systems of capitation, the premise
underlying NHS capitation methods is that
current patterns of expected utilisation should
form the basis for making the equity criterion
operational. However, for two reasons, the NHS
has been reluctant merely to use unadjusted
predictions of utilisation as the basis for capitation
payments. First, current utilisation might to some
extent reflect systematic variations in supply,
implying that existing inequities might be perpe-
tuated if no adjustment were made for such
variations. And second, uncritical use of current
utilisation as the basis for setting capitation
payments might introduce a perverse incentive
for local agents to increase current utilisation in
order to attract higher capitation payments for
their population in the future. These considera-
tions have led to the development of a sophisti-
cated econometric capitation methodology,
principally, on the basis of small area socio-
economic data [5]. The English capitation methods
have been the subject of intense scrutiny, and have
been implemented, or are under consideration for
implementation, in a number of jurisdictions [6–
10]. The methods seek to identify the national
average response, in terms of health care expendi-
ture, to a set of local socio-economic ‘needs’
indicators, after adjusting for supply factors.
It is important to note that, in common with
most capitation methods, the English approach is
conservative, in the sense that it assumes that (on
average) the NHS is currently meeting the desir-
able concept of need, whatever that concept might
be (for example, capacity to benefit, level of
sickness, life expectancy, and so on). The methods
fail to reflect legitimate health care needs that are
not currently met by the NHS. We do not intend
to enter here into the debate as to what is meant by
need, although this clearly should be a germane
focus of enquiry [11]. For the purposes of this
paper, however, by ‘unmet need’ we merely seek to
indicate that certain groups of the population
systematically fail to receive the NHS health care
which other groups with similar health status
receive, implying a departure from the principle of
equal access for equal need underlying the NHS.
The use of empirical utilisation data as the basis of
capitation payments will therefore perpetuate the
inequity implied by the existence of unmet need,
however need is defined (see [4] for a discussion of
these issues).
The Labour government elected in May 1997
brought with it a policy of wishing to address the
persistent and growing inequalities in health which
had become evident in the United Kingdom. The
Government set up an independent enquiry,
chaired by Sir Donald Acheson, which recom-
mended numerous policy options [12]. It then
produced a policy document Saving lives: our
healthier nation [13] which put in place a public
health agenda, with the objective of ‘improving the
health of everyone, especially the worst off’ – that
is, of improving health and reducing health
inequalities.
The commitment to reducing health inequalities
has in turn resulted in a reappraisal of the
capitation criterion in use in England. The
Advisory Committee on Resource Allocation, the
body charged with developing capitation meth-
odologies in England, has been instructed by
ministers to undertake a fundamental review of
methods, incorporating a new criterion for deter-
mining capitation payments: ‘to contribute to the
reduction in avoidable health inequalities’. This
criterion represents a radical departure from that
of seeking to offer equal opportunity of access and
in effect seeks to secure a redistribution of health.
It steers health policy quite determinedly away
from the narrow concept of health care equity
towards the broader concept of health equity, with
its implications for diverse policy areas such as
income redistribution, housing, education, envir-
onment, transport, and so on.
The purpose of this paper is to put forward a
simple economic model of health production, and
to examine the implications of the new criterion
for NHS capitation methods. In the following
section we develop a model of the current
capitation criterion. In the next section on causes
of inequalities of health we further investigate
various sources of inequalities in health, and
we discuss which of these can be addressed
by a change in capitation methodology. The
paper introduces the new capitation criterion,
and discusses some of its political implica-
tions, and the last section offers some concluding
comments.
Amodel of the current capitation
criterion
In this section we explore from a theoretical
perspective why inequalities in health might arise,
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and the implications for health care expenditure of
seeking to reduce observed inequalities. The core
of our exposition relies on an individual’s health
production function. This traces the efficient
relationship between lifetime health care expendi-
ture and health outcome, and is illustrated as the
curve PP in Figure 1. For a given lifetime
expenditure E on health care, and given current
best clinical practice, the production function
shows the maximum attainable health outcome
(say life expectancy) Y of the individual. The
maximum attainable life expectancy is Ymak. The
health production function is of course highly
stylised, and requires careful examination before
being used for analytic purposes.
First, we assume a single health care provider,
which we can call the NHS. In practice, there may
be available other providers of health care (such as
private sector providers). For the purposes of this
paper we think of these as being potential
exogenous influences on the NHS production
function shown in Figure 1. We also wish to side
step the issue of which concept of ‘health outcome’
should be employed. The reader may wish to think
of this as quality-adjusted life years. However, for
expository purposes, we shall restrict discussion to
a measure based on unadjusted life years. We do
not believe that the choice of outcome measure
materially affects the theoretical argument.
We define health care expenditure to be lifetime
expenditure by the NHS, discounted to birth. The
capitation criterion under investigation is directed
at health inequalities avoidable by the NHS, and
we therefore concentrate on health outcomes that
can be affected by that agency’s actions. In
specifying such a function we are of course
presuming that extra health care activity can
contribute to increased health, a claim that could
be open to challenge. It is moreover important to
acknowledge that there are many other exogenous
factors that may influence the nature of the health
production function and consequent inequalities.
These include the individual’s genetic character-
istics, occupation, use of non-NHS health care,
lifestyle and other external influences such as the
environment, the economy and the actions of
governmental and other agencies. Changes in these
factors might change the form of the NHS
production function. For example, if an individual
takes up a healthier lifestyle, this might give rise to
an upward shift. We do not pursue these external
influences further here, but it is worth noting that
their inclusion in the model as a vector of
circumstances is not in principle problematic.
Also, for ease of exposition, we assume a
constant health care technology over the patient’s
lifetime. Of course, the rapid change in technolo-
gies that occurs in practice considerable compli-
cates the practical problem for the health care
system (if it is to secure productive efficiency). This
interesting issue is however not germane to this
theoretical discussion. More generally, we restrict
the analysis to the deterministic case, and do not
introduce uncertainty arising from technologies,
individual characteristics, external circumstances
or NHS budget constraints. In practice, the
effectiveness of health care is likely – to a greater
or lesser extent – to fall some way short of the ideal
indicated by the production function. Random
inefficiencies of this sort do not materially affect
the argument. Systematically larger inefficiencies
suffered by particular groups relative to others are
however discussed in some detail below.
The question now arises: given the shape of an
individual’s health production function, how much
expenditure should the health care system devote
to that individual? In systems which are not budget
constrained, we might in principle expect to
observe expenditure up to the point where margin-
al benefit is zero. However, within a budget-
constrained system of health care we must assume
that some other criterion applies.
Many commentators argue that in these circum-
stances any decision rule for deciding how much to
spend should be based on maximising the health
output of the system, given its budget constraint.
This principle gives rise to a simple decision rule:
apply a uniform cut-off cost per life year saved,
Life
Years
NHS  ExpenditureO E
Ymax
Y
N
N
P
P
Figure 1. The health production function
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above which no treatment is offered. The cut-off
can be represented by the slope of the line NN in
Figure 1, which yields the optimal expenditure for
the individual under scrutiny, given the global
budget constraint. The same sloped line is applied
to all individuals, whatever the shape of their
health production functions. This model underlies
almost all the literature on economic evaluation in
health care and the use of health benefit measures
such as quality-adjusted life years. There is
probably a widespread consensus amongst health
economists that it is – or at least ought to be – the
principal efficiency criterion for allocating re-
sources in health care [14]. We term it the health
maximisation model. It is important to note that –
if we define need in terms of marginal capacity to
benefit from health care – the health maximisation
model is consistent with the founding principle of
the UK NHS – that those in equal need should
have equal access to services [15].
Causes of inequalities in health
Implicit in the new NHS capitation criterion, with
its emphasis on avoidable health inequalities, is the
suggestion that currently NHS resources are not
being allocated in a socially desirable fashion. In
particular, it suggests that, relative to their more
healthy counterparts, the less healthy are receiving
less health than is socially desirable. Three classes
of circumstances within the NHS might give rise to
this state of affairs:
* systematic variations in health care quality
(variations in technical efficiency);
* systematic variations in utilisation of health
care services (variations in allocative ineffi-
ciency),
* systematic variations in health production
functions (variations in people’s efficiency in
producing health).
We now consider these sources of inequalities in
turn, and we discuss which of them can be
addressed by a change in capitation methodology.
Variations in health care quality
Suppose all individuals have the same production
function and that the same cut-off criterion is
applied to all individuals. That is, given the budget
constraint, optimal expenditure E is being directed
at all individuals. However, services for some
classes of individuals are technically inefficient in
the sense that they offer poorer quality than those
for healthier individuals do – that is, outcomes lie
below the production function frontier. This
implies that treatments for two equally needy
individuals differ due to variations in technical
efficiency. This situation is represented in Figure 2
by the point L for the disadvantaged individual,
giving rise to health outcome YL, as opposed to
YH for the individual receiving better quality care.
Services to less healthy populations may be less
technically efficient than other services for a
number of reasons – expenditure may not be
allocated optimally across an individual’s lifetime,
health care staff may be less motivated to secure
good outcomes or may communicate poorly with
less healthy individuals, recruitment of staff may
be more difficult or capital configurations less
appropriate in areas where the less healthy live,
and so on. In this case, it is important to identify
the true production possibilities, and to distinguish
between improvements in outcome that can be
secured by improved use of existing health care
resources, and those that require additional
resources. Addressing inequalities arising from
technical inefficiency requires no change to capita-
tion methods, because existing allocation of
expenditure is optimal – it is the use of resources,
which is inefficient.
It is important to note, however, that this builds
on the assumption that technical inefficiency is
Life
Years
NHS ExpenditureO
Y
H
N
N
P
P
Y
L L
E
Figure 2. Inequalities in health arising from variations in
technical efficiency for two individuals
For Evaluation Only.
Copyright (c) by Foxit Software Company, 2004 - 2007
Edited by Foxit PDF Editor
exogenous to the capitation system. It might be the
case that the chosen capitation method provides
an incentive to behave inefficiently. For example,
capitation payments positively weighted for the
current sickness of the population could provide
an incentive not to use resources efficiently for fear
of improving the population’s health status and
thereby losing budget. For a discussion of
behavioural responses to fixed budgets see Refer-
ences [16–18].
For the purpose of this paper, however, we
assume exogeneity of inefficient behaviour to
capitation systems. Policy attention should, there-
fore, focus not on changing capitation methods,
but on other instruments to secure better use of
resources in services for disadvantaged popula-
tions. Various quality initiatives now put in place
within the NHS, such as the publication of
performance data and systems of audit and
inspection, may help secure progress towards this
objective [19].
Variations in utilisation of health care services
Suppose that all individuals have the same
production function and all are being treated
technically efficiently (that is, on rather than below
the production function). However, a stricter cut-
off criterion is applied to some classes of indivi-
duals than to others, implying the existence of
allocative inefficiency. This may, for example, be
due to market or informational failures on the
demand or supply side of health care. Inequalities
in utilisation have the consequence that, although
needs are identical, expenditure on health care
is less for some groups than others. Figure 3
illustrates the principle for two individuals, with
the stricter treatment criterion applied to the
disadvantaged individual L resulting in lower
expenditure EL and poorer outcome YL than for
the other individualH. Under these circumstances,
use of capitation payments EL and EH based on
empirical data will perpetuate the implied inequity.
If a stricter cut-off criterion is currently being
applied to some individuals than to others, a
fundamental principle underlying many health
care systems (and certainly the NHS) is being
breached – that of equal access to health care for
those in equal need. There is indeed evidence of
considerable unmet need and of substantial
inequalities in utilisation in UK health care [20].
Minority ethnic groups, disadvantaged socio-
economic groups, the elderly and persons living
in remote areas experience inequalities, most
notably in primary care, in prevention and health
promotion, and in the treatment of coronary heart
disease. These inequalities in utilisation are present
even after controlling for ‘need’.
Inequalities in utilisation unrelated to need
imply that health maximisation is not being
secured, because the underserved have a greater
capacity to benefit from expenditure than the
relatively ‘overserved’. A redirection of resources
towards ‘underserved’ individuals is required, with
an implication that capitation payments for
disadvantaged populations should rise relative to
the remainder of the population. This does not
require definition of a new criterion for setting
health care capitation payments. Rather, it re-
quires the formulation of strategies aimed at
eliminating allocative inefficiency in the provision
of health care. The policy implication is therefore
to design interventions that reduce utilisation
inequalities. The nature of these will of course be
highly dependent on the reason for inequalities in
access to services. In practice very few studies have
sought to address such policy issues [20–22].
For the purposes of capitation, attention should
therefore focus on the magnitude of the associated
unmet need, and on the expenditure consequences
of rectifying the problem. In terms of Figure 3, the
requirement is to quantify the shifts in expenditure
ELEH required to ensure that all citizens receive
the same level of care. By definition, uncritical
analysis of existing expenditure patterns will not
yield useful information for this purpose. In
Life
Years
NHS ExpenditureO  H
YH
P
YL
E L
NH
NL
E
Figure 3. Inequalities in health arising from variations in access
for two individuals
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principle, we should therefore seek out variations
in the slope of the cut-off criterion applied to
different social groups. In practice this is likely to
be difficult. However, it may be that there exist
areas of the country where the unmet need has
been eliminated, and that analysis of existing
expenditure patterns within those areas may yield
an acceptable basis for setting national capitation
payments. Sutton and Lock show how this could
be done in a Scottish context [23], although the
rather arbitrary method of selecting ‘exemplar’
areas adopted in that study indicates the type of
practical problems likely to be encountered. Of
course, even if capitation payments can be
corrected to account for unmet need, there remains
a performance management problem of ensuring
that the increased funds associated with unmet
need are indeed directed towards the currently
underserved population.
Variations in health production functions
Suppose that all individuals are being treated with
technical and allocative efficiency, in accordance
with the health maximisation model. However,
individuals have different health production func-
tions, so that their health outcomes vary. This
situation can be illustrated in Figure 4, which
compares two individuals with different health
profiles, in the sense that – at the same level of
health expenditure – individual L is unambigu-
ously less healthy than individual H. This is due to
determinants of health which are beyond the
immediate influence of the health services, such
as the social and economic environment, genetical
endowments, or lifestyle choices of the individuals.
The cut-off criterion is indicated by the slope of the
straight lines, and gives rise to health outcomes YH
and YL. The implied capitation payments are EH
and EL. Application of an equal cut-off criterion
implies smaller health inequalities in comparison
to an equal allocation of expenditure to H and L.
If all patients are being treated in accordance
with the health maximisation principle, but the
outcome is nevertheless unacceptable, then a
reallocation of resources according to some equity
criterion is required, under which resources are
redirected towards less healthy individuals. Avoid-
able inequalities of this sort arise, even though
quality of and access to health care are equal for
identical citizens, because of differences between
individuals which are outside the control of the
health services. Policy attention to such inequal-
ities reflects a concern with principles of vertical
equity between individuals, rather than the tradi-
tional concern with horizontal equity embedded in
most capitation methodology. In principle, society
should address vertical equity issues by consider-
ing an optimal reallocation of all resources, both
private and public. However, our focus is purely
on the health care sector, and in this context the
unacceptable health inequalities imply that a
fundamental revision of capitation methods may
therefore be required.
Amodel of the new capitation criterion
Policy to correct for variations in people’s
efficiency in producing health implies an interest
in increasing the level of health care for the less
healthy relative to that received by the healthy in
order to compensate for such disadvantage. Like
Case 2, this implies a shift of health care resources
in the form of capitation payments towards the
less healthy. In contrast to Case 2, however, the
objective here is to rectify a perceived injustice in
individual endowments, and not inefficiencies
within the health care system. In the extreme case,
of wishing to eliminate avoidable health inequal-
ities, a situation as in Figure 5 might obtain.
Expenditure on individual L is increased in order
to secure the same life span as currently enjoyed by
individual H. This results in increased capitation
payment EL. Note that the marginal cost per life
Life
Years
NHS  ExpenditureO               EH
YH
PH
EL
YL
PL
Figure 4. Inequalities in health arising from different produc-
tion functions for two individuals
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year saved becomes higher for individual L (the
associated line NLNL becomes shallower than the
original NN). This might imply that the unhealthy
individual receives treatments which the healthy
individual does not receive, or that the unhealthy
individual receives more expensive treatments, or
treatments of a higher quality.
The situation set out in Figure 5 would result in
an unambiguous rise in the health care budget
requirement. If this were considered unrealistic,
the solution would be simultaneously to reduce
expenditure on individual 1 whilst increasing
expenditure on individual 2. That is, health
inequalities would be reduced partially by worsen-
ing the outcome for healthier individuals. In
Figure 5, a revenue neutral solution would then
result in a common life expectancy somewhere
between YH and YL. (Whether this is politically
feasible is another matter!).
The strategy of eliminating avoidable mortality
is of course extreme. In practice, both limited
technological capacity and strength of public
preferences might give rise to a policy reluctance
to seek to eliminate variations entirely. A more
realistic criterion is therefore to reduce avoidable
inequality. Figure 6 shows a situation where some
unhealthy individuals are unable to achieve the
same life span as individual H, in which case the
health services would – under the criterion of
‘eliminating avoidable inequality’ – spend up to
the point where the marginal benefit of health care
expenditure and the slope of the cut-off is zero.
The remaining inequalities – symbolised by the
distance between YH and YL could only be
eliminated by reducing the health status of
individual H. If this is politically undesirable, the
remaining inequalities are unavoidable by the
NHS.
It is likely that a broader view of social policy
would indicate that interventions in other public
policy areas – such as housing, public transport or
income redistribution – are effective in eliminating
health inequalities. Successful policies in other
areas would result in an upward shift of the health
production function in Figure 6. This argument
can be extended to the case where it is possible but
inefficient to reduce inequalities with health care
interventions. In a situation where inequalities in
health could be further reduced only with very
high health care expenditure, public expenditure in
other policy areas might lead to exogenous
improvements in health production. This combi-
nation of strategies requires less public expenditure
than a solely health care policy strategy, if the
expenditure on alternative policies are smaller than
the saved health care expenditure. It is possible,
that health care policy is entirely inefficient in
tackling inequalities in health care, and all inequal-
ities are reduced more economically with policies
in other areas. In order to make this assessment,
the marginal effectiveness in reducing inequalities
in health of alternative public policies (and
possibly even portfolios of policies) should be
compared. In principle, a socially optimal health
inequalities policy would allocate resources across
policy areas so that the marginal benefit of public
expenditure (in terms of reducing health inequal-
ities) would be equal in each policy area.
There is another reason why society might
not want to adopt the complete elimination of
inequalities as an objective. The new criterion
Life
Years
NHS  ExpenditureO              EH
YH
EL
YL
EL
*
NL
NL
Figure 5. Expenditure change required to equalise life expec-
tancy
Life
Years
NHS ExpenditureO EH
YH
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*
Unavoidable
inequalities
}
Figure 6. Inequalities unavoidable by the health services
For Evaluation Only.
Copyright (c) by Foxit Software Company, 2004 - 2007
Edited by Foxit PDF Editor
requires a sacrifice in overall population health. In
Figure 5, total health gain for a fixed budget is less
than in the health maximisation model outlined in
Section 2 – the common life expectancy under the
new capitation criterion is less than the average of
YH and YL. The policy maker’s problem now
becomes one of balancing total health gain (an
efficiency objective) against reductions in inequal-
ities (an equity objective) [24,25]. A possible
algebraic formulation of this problem is given in
Appendix A. The problem can be illustrated as in
Figure 7, which traces the health production
possibilities arising from the health production
functions for two individuals with different levels
of health (Appendix B shows how Figure 7 can be
derived from the individual production functions).
It indicates – for a fixed budget constraint – the
possible mixes of maximum health outcomes YL
and YH that the NHS could in principle secure for
the two individuals. The point H indicates the
maximum aggregate health attainable for the two
individuals subject to the given budget constraint.
The point Q is the point where the two would
secure equal health, and the distance QQ0
indicates the aggregate loss in health brought
about by pursuit of such pure equality. In practice,
it seems likely that there exists a social welfare
function which results in a policy intermediate
between the points Q and H, reflecting the
politically preferred balance between efficiency and
equity objectives.
The new criterion for setting capitation pay-
ments requires a clear normative definition of the
concept of equity in health which policy makers
have in mind. Any deviation from the equal cut-off
criterion may imply that individuals with the same
capacity to benefit from health care receive
different amounts of health care resources. Un-
equal treatments require political justification, and
this is the role of the equity concept. There is a
substantial if not always enlightening theoretical
economics literature on equity concepts in health
and health care [26], and there has been little
empirical examination of what meanings or precise
specifications stakeholders attach to the concept
[27]. Therefore, it will be difficult to find agreement
on a particular equity concept. Moreover, once
identified, the theoretical equity concept needs to
be translated into an unambiguous resource
allocation pattern. This is without doubt an acute
political problem [28].
Finally, it is worth noting that the new capita-
tion method implies better medical treatment of
unhealthy groups of the population. This gives rise
to major practical difficulties in defining criteria
for membership of the targeted group, and
ensuring that health care is delivered in accordance
with policy intentions. Furthermore, it might
result in incentives for individuals to acquire
membership of those groups that are given
privileged access. The variety of practical difficul-
ties that emerge when seeking to make operational
principles of vertical equity – as distinct from
horizontal equity – are considered elsewhere [29].
Conclusions
This paper has sought to link the economic
literature on health inequalities with the policy
issue of capitation payments in the light of a new
capitation criterion adopted in England. It has
demonstrated that there are three broad categories
of causes of health inequality relevant to the health
sector: variations in efficiency, variations in access
to care, and variations in personal health produc-
tion. This last poses the most fundamental
challenge to capitation policy, as addressing it
implies a desire to move away from a policy of
equality of access (horizontal equity) towards one
of targeting health care at particular classes of
individual (vertical equity). There is clearly a
major challenge in seeking out the evidence on
which the change to the capitation methods would
be based. Two broad classes of information
required relate to the effectiveness of interven-
tions in reducing health inequalities, and public
H*
Q*
YL
YH
Q0
Figure 7. The health production possibility frontier
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preferences regarding the importance of reducing
health inequalities. Both sorts of evidence are in
short supply [30,31].
Furthermore, there is no guarantee that mere
alteration of capitation payments will ensure that
additional resources reach deprived populations.
By definition, the new vertical equity criterion
requires that the health sector alters the way in
which it delivers health care to those with poor
health expectancy. Yet, in general, directing extra
‘health inequality’ resources at needy areas will not
necessarily lead to reduction in health inequalities.
Rather, it may merely lead to perpetuation of
existing patterns of utilisation in an area, albeit at
a higher level than before. Important performance
management and auditing issues are, therefore,
raised if the policy reflected in the revised
capitation payments is to be translated into desired
action by health care professionals.
The discussion has emphasised the role of health
services in addressing health inequalities, and has
made only general reference to the broader
influences of social policy on inequalities. This
emphasis reflects the current administrative reality
– that health ministries perceive their principal role
to be one of delivering health care. Yet, there is no
reason in principle why health ministries should
not be responsible for addressing the health
inequality implications of all areas of public
policy. Under this arrangement they would be
responsible for auditing the impact on health
inequalities of major public sector initiatives, and
for levying ‘taxes’ (or providing subsidies) to
encourage policies that contribute to health
inequality policy. Nurturing this role would be
one approach towards the optimal distribution of
all public resources.
It is also important to note that an emphasis on
health inequalities offers a profound challenge to
the evaluation of health care technology. In
principle, it implies that technologies should be
evaluated differently according to the health status
of the individual – that is, the need to target
certain unhealthy groups may mean that certain
treatments are recommended for those groups
which are not considered cost-effective for heal-
thier groups. This consideration complicates the
task of designing and evaluating trials enormously,
and implies a move towards Williams’ notion of
equity-adjusted QALYs as the basis for economic
evaluation. The principle also offers considerable
challenges in framing intelligible clinical guidelines
for practitioners. Yet the logic of incorporating a
health inequality criterion into resource allocation
leads inevitably to its incorporation into economic
evaluation of technologies, with all the attendant
complications.
The new capitation criterion, therefore, raises
many more general issues relating to the distribu-
tion of resources in health care and the broader
public sector. Many of these issues are immensely
challenging. However, we believe that the economic
models presented here offer a systematic and
coherent framework for addressing these challenges.
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Appendix A ^ An algebraic exposition
Assume that NHS expenditure is distributed
efficiently over the lifetime of the patient, and that
the objective is to maximise health outputs
(summed across all individuals), with a fixed
budget constraint. If the individual’s health
production function is fið:Þ, then a health max-
imisation objective is allocate expenditure xi so as
to maximise
P
i fiðxiÞ; subject to
P
i xi ¼ B; where
B is the global budget constraint. This yields the
familiar result that the optimal level of expenditure
xi on individual i is given by @fi=@xi ¼ f;
indicating an identical benefit/cost cut-off ratio N
for all individuals i.
Suppose now the policy maker’s problem
becomes one of balancing total health gain (an
efficiency objective) against reductions in inequal-
ities (an equity objective). One possible algebraic
formulation of the problem is as follows.
Maximize a
X
i
fiðxiÞ  1=e
X
i
L fi xið Þf g
e
subject to
X
i
xi ¼ B
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where L is some benchmark ‘maximum’ achievable
health outcome (lifespan), a reflects the impor-
tance of the total health outcomes objective
relative to the inequalities objective, and e>1
indicates the degree of aversion to health inequal-
ities. A value of e=1 would indicate no interest in
health inequalities, while increases imply an
increase in the relative importance attached to
large deviations from L.
The first-order condition for individual i is
given by
@fi
@xi
¼
l
aþ L fi xið Þf g
e1
where l is the Lagrange multiplier. Thus, in
general, the solutions xi will be such that
individuals with high life expectancy are given
higher treatment cut-off ratios N. Note that, in the
special case when e=2, a and L are interchange-
able, in the sense that an increase in L is directly
equivalent to an increase in a. The problem
therefore reduces to one of minimising squared
health variations, defined as
P
i L fi xið Þf g
2. The
choice of ‘lifespan’ parameter L reflects the
importance of maximizing health relative to
reducing inequalities and no additional choice of
a is required – choice of a high value of L then
leads to relatively low variations in personal values
of N. In these circumstances, @fi=@xi /
L fi xið Þf g
1 – that is, at the optimum, cut-off
rates will be inversely proportional to life years
lost, as defined by L fi xi
  
.
Appendix B ^ Derivation of health
production possibility frontier
This appendix indicates how the (two person)
production possibility frontier can be derived from
the individual health production functions. The
production frontiers for person H and person L
are replicated (in a transposed state) in respectively
the top left and bottom right corners of the
diagram. The fixed expenditure budget constraint
EH þ EL is represented by the straight line in the
bottom left quadrant. All expenditure choices
must conform to this constraint. They are then
reflected, via the production functions, into the
top right quadrant, which therefore, yields the
production possibility frontier, which is repro-
duced as Figure 7 in the main text.
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